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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appellant Interwest Construction respectfully submits the 
following reply brief. 
I. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions or 
statutes in this case. 
II. ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
INTERWEST IS NOT REQUIRED TO MARSHALL EVIDENCE 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION WAS NEVER IN DISPUTE. 
Palmers claim that Interwest is required to marshall all 
evidence in support of the trial courtf s findings and that 
Interwest has failed to do so. However, in this case there is 
no need to marshall the facts and present them in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings because the facts 
regarding the contract between Interwest and Palmers, the amount 
unpaid thereunder and the circumstances under which the unpaid 
amount would become due and payable have never been in dispute. 
These facts were not only admitted but alleged by Interwest in 
the Complaint and Amended Complaint filed herein. The simple 
issue before this Court is not one of fact nor whether the 
evidence supports the judgment but is one of law, i.e., whether 
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the trial court correctly interpreted the contract between the 
parties. Interwest does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings and conclusions 
but instead challenges the court's determination of the legal 
principles employed in arriving at those findings and 
conclusions. The trial court's conclusions of law are "accorded 
no particular deference, we review them for correctness." Doelle 
v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989). 
POINT ii: 
PALMERS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO FINAL PAYMENT. 
Regardless of when the Treatment Plant was completed, the 
fact remains that Interwest has not been paid in full by Thiokol 
for the work performed under its general contract with Thiokol 
and pursuant to the clear terms of the Subcontract between 
Palmers and Interwest, Palmers is not entitled to full payment 
until and unless Interwest is been paid in full. 
Palmers argue that bits and pieces of the contract have 
been put forward in support of Interwest's arguments however, 
Palmers' ignores the fact that it is appropriate to look to the 
contract as a whole when the interpretation of that contract is 
in question. Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P.2d 
492, 494 (Utah App. 1991) citing Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. 
Blomguist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). When read as a 
whole, the Subcontract Agreement is clear that Palmers was bound 
by and subject to the general contract between Thiokol and 
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Interwest and until that contract was fully satisfied, Palmers' 
performance under the Subcontract Agreement was not complete and 
they were not entitled to final payment. 
POINT III: 
INTERWEST IS ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION 
AGAINST THE COSTS IT INCURRED IN DEFENDING THIS ACTION. 
Palmers argue that contracts of indemnity are to be 
strictly construed and that the Subcontract should be construed 
against Interwest and interrupted as not requiring Palmers to 
indemnify Interwest against claims that Palmers' work was 
defective. Palmers go so far as to cite Pickhover vs. Smith 
Management Corporation, 771 P.2d 664 (Utah App 1989) as support 
for the strict construction rule. However, Palmers ignore both 
the rationale for the strict construction rule and the ruling of 
this Court in the Pickhover case. This Court, after a careful 
analysis of the current trend of the law, ruled in Pickhover; 
We hold that the rule [strict construction of indemnity 
agreements] applies only to indemnity provisions where the 
indemnitee seeks indemnification for the consequences of 
its own negligence. Id at 670. 
Palmers cite two additional cases in support of their 
argument that Interwest is not entitled to indemnification from 
them: Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Electric Corporation, 396 P.2d 377 
(Ca. 1964) and Tvee Construction Co. v. Pacific Northwest Bell 
Telephone Company, 472 P.2d 411 (Wash. App. 1970). Both cases 
are easily distinguishable. In Goldman, the general contractor 
sought indemnification against its own negligence involving a 
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job site injury• In Tvee Construction, the indemnitee directed 
the indemnitor to do certain work in a particular way which 
ultimately resulted in damage to the indemnitee's property. In 
both cases the indemnitee sought to impose upon the indemnitor 
the obligation of answering for the negligence or intentional 
acts of the indemnitee. 
In this case, Interwest has only sought to have Palmers 
abide by their Subcontract Agreement and hold Interwest harmless 
from Palmers' own negligence or breaches of contract and against 
the negligence or breaches of the subcontractors and suppliers 
for which Palmers are responsible. Interwest has not sought nor 
has Palmers provided any defense of claims that Interwest itself 
was negligent. 
This case arose because Interwest found itself in the 
middle of a dispute between Thiokol, who claimed the tanks 
supplied by Palmers were defective and Palmers, who claimed that 
the tanks failed because of Thiokol's modifications. No one has 
claimed nor is there any evidence to support a claim that 
Interwest contributed to the failure in any way, yet Thiokol 
withheld funds earned by and rightfully belonging to Interwest 
solely on account of the tank failure. Under such 
circumstances, Interwest did not and does not seek to shift the 
burden of its own negligence or breaches of contract to Palmers, 
but has merely sought to have Palmers defend Interwest against 
Thiokol's claims and hold it harmless from the damage Interwest 
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suffered on account of Thiokol's withholding of payment. 
Palmers also argue that because the trial court ultimately 
found that the cause of the failure was the overfilling the 
tanks and not poor workmanship or faulty materials, as was 
claimed by Thiokol, Interwest is not entitled to be indemnified 
by Palmers. Palmers' argument leads to the conclusion that any 
party that seeks to be indemnified against the claimed 
negligence or breach of contract of another can only recover if, 
in fact, the indemnitor is ultimately found to be negligent or 
to have breached its contract. If such an argument were 
accepted by this Court, the result would be that in all cases in 
which indemnification is an element, no indemnitee would ever 
accept a tender of the defense of a claim and both the 
indemnitor and the indemnitee would be required to defend 
against the same claims resulting, as it has in this case, in 
the expenditure of additional attorneys' fees by both parties. 
III. CONCLUSION 
There is no evidence that requires marshalling in this case 
and this Court may review the trial court's decision for 
correctness. The trial court was incorrect in its interpretation 
of the Subcontract Agreement and should have given effect to the 
full intention of the agreement which is clearly to place upon 
Palmers the sole responsibility of defending the quality of its 
workmanship and materials. 
Interwest respectfully requests that this Court remand this 
case to the trial court with instructions reinstate Interwest's 
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Complaint against Palmers and to award reasonable attorney's 
fees to Interwest. 
DATED this of August, 1993. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Steven D. Crawley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Interwest Construction 
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